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I.

Introduction

This symposium issue1 examines securitization a decade after the
2008 financial crisis. Prior to the crisis, securitization was one of
America’s dominant means of financing.2 Many observers, however,
blamed securitization for causing the crisis, sparking regulation that
arguably has been overly restrictive and, in some cases, even punitive.3
Where are we now?
II.

What Is Securitization?

Securitization enables a company to raise financing without
borrowing from a bank (it therefore “disintermediates,” or removes, the
∗
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1
Symposium, Securitization: Ten Years after the Financial Crisis, 37 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 757–927 (2018). Articles are authored by Tamar Frankel;
Jason H.P. Kravitt, Sairah Burki & Stacy S. Lee; Jonathan C. Lipson; and
Matthew C. Turk.
2
Exclusion from the Definition of Investment Company for Structured
Financings, 57 Fed. Reg. 56,248 (Nov. 27, 1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
270).
3
See, e.g., Ronald S. Borod, Belling the Cat: Taming the Securitization Beast
Without Killing It, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 643, 644–47 (2012).
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need for banks as financial intermediaries)4 and without issuing securities
whose pricing is dependent on the creditworthiness of the company.5 In a
highly simplified example,6 a company will sell certain of its rights to
payment (financial assets), such as loans or accounts receivable, to a
“bankruptcy remote” special purpose entity (SPE, sometimes called a
special purpose vehicle or SPV). The SPE will issue securities7 to investors, repayable from collections of cash on the financial assets. The
investors thus look to the financial assets, not to the company itself, for
repayment.8
In 2007, the volume of securities issued in securitization transactions approximated $6.44 trillion in the United States9 and €595 billion
in Europe.10 The financial crisis caused these levels to decline precipitously.11 By 2015, for example, the volume of U.S. securitization

4

Steven L. Schwarcz, The Governance Structure of Shadow Banking: Rethinking
Assumptions about Limited Liability, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2014)
(explaining how disintermediation is characteristic of the so-called shadow
banking system).
5
Jonathan C. Lipson, Re: Defining Securitization, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1229,
1239–45 (2012) (identifying the elements and functions of securitization).
6
For a more nuanced examination of securitization and its forms, compare id. at
1271–80 (arguing for a redefinition of securitization), with Steven L. Schwarcz,
What Is Securitization? And for What Purpose?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1288–
99 (2012) (addressing issues with Lipson’s proposed definition of securitization).
7
These debt securities are often called asset-backed securities (ABS). When
specifically backed by financial assets consisting of mortgage loans, these debt
securities are commonly called mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Schwarcz,
supra note 6, at 1292.
8
Id. at 1293.
9
SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, Vol. 111, No. 2, RESEARCH QUARTERLY 2
(2008), www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/us-research-quarterly-2007q4.pdf [https://perma.cc/25KD-RHXY].
10
ASS’N OF FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, SECURITIZATION DATA REPORT: EUROPEAN
STRUCTURED FINANCE FOR Q1 2016 7 (2016), https://www.
afme.eu/globalassets/downloads/data/securitisation/2016/afme-stn-securitisationdata-report-q1-20161-v3.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TP-BCJW].
11
See id. (detailing the total issuance of securities in Europe and the United
States from 2006 until 2016).
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issuance had collapsed to $1.9 trillion,12 and the volume of European
securitization issuance had declined to €214 billion.13
While securitization is still under suspicion in the United States,
it is increasingly used as a financial tool abroad.14 One of the key goals of
the European Commission’s proposed Capital Markets Union, for
example, is to further facilitate securitization as a source of capital market
financing, as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies
operating in the European Union.15 Because financial assets can be easier
to understand and value, if not safer, than the business and risks
associated with operating a company, securitization offers companies an
efficient and usually lower-cost funding source.16 Authors Kravitt, Burki,
and Lee add that regulators “generally acknowledge that, when utilized

12

Press Release, Sec. Indus. & Fin. Mkts. Ass’n, SIFMA Issues 2015 Securitization Year in Review (Apr. 7, 2016), http://www.sifma.org/newsroom/
2016/sifma-issues-2015-securitization-year-in-review/ [https://perma.cc/ 4XNABHZA].
13
ASS’N OF FIN. MKTS. IN EUROPE, supra note 10, at 7.
14
Securitisation: It’s Back, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2014, at 12 (discussing the
benefits of increased securitization for Europe).
15
The Capital Markets Union initiative includes a range of reforms of various
sectors of the European financial system to help build an integrated European
capital market. See Commission Staff Working Document: Economic Analysis, at
8–20, COM (2015) 468 final (Sept. 30, 2015), http://edz.bib.unimannheim.de/edz/pdf/swd/2015/swd-2015-0183-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/982LA2U4] (discussing the benefits of decreased reliance on bank-based finance).
The key objectives of the Capital Markets Union are to improve access to
financing for European businesses, to increase and diversify sources of funding
from investors in the EU and all over the world, and to make the fragmented
European markets more integrated, efficient and effective. See Commission
Green Paper on Building a Capital Markets Union, at 4, COM (2015) 63 final
(Feb. 18, 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/ finance/consultations/2015/capital-marketsunion/docs/green-paper_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/WRR9-5KA6].
16
Securities backed by financial assets are usually more creditworthy, and thus
can be sold at a lower interest rate, than securities issued directly by the
originators. STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE
PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:3 (3d ed. & Supps. 2010) (explaining
that, except for the most highly rated issuers, securities issued in securitization
transactions are typically more highly rated than the issuer’s own debt securities
and, even where the latter are more highly rated, securitization provides
additional market flexibility to obtain financing).
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properly and wisely, securitization is an important source of funding” for
the real economy.17
III.

Fixing Securitization’s Abuses

There is little doubt certain abuses of securitization were causal
factors in the financial crisis.18 The U.S. regulatory responses to securitization are primarily embodied in the Dodd-Frank Act and partially in
U.S. implementation of the Basel III capital requirements.19 I have argued
these responses conceptually fall into four categories: (i) increasing
disclosure; (ii) requiring risk-retention; (iii) reforming rating agencies;
and (iv) imposing capital requirements.20 The European regulatory
responses conceptually fall into five categories: the same four indicated
above, as well as requiring certain due diligence.21
The symposium papers largely concur that these regulatory
responses inadequately address securitization’s abuses. Kravitt, Burki,
and Lee argue, for example, the “post-crisis securitization industry is
subject to an extensive patchwork of rules, many of which . . . don’t
address the underlying causes of the crisis.”22 I agree, except insofar as I
will discuss how the EU’s simple, transparent, and standardized (STS)
framework addresses the problem of complexity.23
Otherwise, these regulatory responses tend to miss the mark.24
For example, one of the primary criticisms of securitization has been of
its originate-to-distribute (OTD) model of making and collecting (pooling) loans to securitize, thereby arguably creating moral hazard because
the makers (originators) of the loans do not hold onto, and thus do not

17

See Jason H.P. Kravitt et al., Some Thoughts on Financial Regulatory Reform
Adopted in Response to the Financial Crisis of 2008/9, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 779, 785 (2018).
18
Mathew C. Turk, Regulation by Rulemaking or by Settlement?, 37 REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 861, 870–74 (2018) (discussing the securitization of
residential mortgages as a primary cause of the 2008 crisis).
19
See id. at 876 (reviewing the Dodd-Frank reforms); Kravitt et al., supra note
17, at 789–99 (describing the Basel III framework).
20
Steven L. Schwarcz, A Global Perspective on Securitised Debt, in CAPITAL
MARKETS UNION IN EUROPE (Guido Ferrarini et al. eds.) (2018).
21
Id.
22
Kravitt et al., supra note 17, at 781–82.
23
See infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
24
See, e.g., Turk, supra note 18, at 901–10.
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necessarily bear, risk for the ultimate performance of the loans.25 To
reduce moral hazard, the Dodd-Frank Act requires lenders to retain an
unhedged portion—ordinarily at least 5 percent—of the credit risk on the
loans they sell into securitization transactions.26 By compelling lenders to
have “skin in the game,” Congress believed lenders would act more
prudently when originating loans.27
Symposium author Turk uses that risk-retention example to
argue that although Dodd-Frank-Act and its associated rulemakings
appear to impose “a comprehensive new regulatory framework for
securitization,” the “real-world effect” of the framework is de minimis.28
Contrary to the premise that lenders retained minimal risk on the loans
they sold into securitization transactions, he observes,” [i]n reality, it was
common practice for the bank sponsoring a securitization to retain a
substantial amount of the . . . risk” on those loans.29 In principle,30 I agree
with Professor Turk’s observation to the extent it concerns risk-retention:
In my experience—which is confirmed by market
information—sophisticated purchasers have generally,
even before the financial crisis, required sellers of loans
to retain skin in the game, or the equivalent. This not only
helps to realign incentives between the parties but also
provides the fundamental solution to the “lemons”
problem of asymmetric information . . . . These observations cast doubt on the need for regulatory intervention to
25

Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH.
U. L. REV. 211, 256 (2009).
26
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o–11 (2012). Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires this risk retention
for all but the highest quality loans that originators sell. Originators and other
sellers of Qualified Residential Mortgage loans—a designation based on a
borrower’s ability to repay the mortgage loan at origination, verification of the
borrower’s income, and certain other relevant considerations—are not subject to
risk-retention requirements.
27
Steven L. Schwarcz, Secured Transactions and Financial Stability: Regulatory
Challenges, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4 (forthcoming 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3033052.
28
Turk, supra note 18, at 880, 901.
29
Id. at 880 (highlighting “the fact that the entire [risk retention] rule rests on a
mistaken premise”).
30
I note, technically, that risk retention on originated loans and on loans sold by
a sponsor into a securitization transaction can be different if the sponsor is not the
loan originator.
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attempt to correct a market failure that the market has
already addressed.31
Professor Turk further explains “sponsor banks opted to hold
onto part of the risk from their securitizations for the specific purpose of
signaling the quality of the securities they were issuing to investors.”32 I
have argued that this signaling inadvertently created a unique informational market failure, one in which the failure is not asymmetric information, but mutual misinformation caused by complexity such that
neither the sponsor of the securitization nor the investors fully understand
the risks associated with the underlying financial assets.33
Symposium author Lipson makes an interesting and novel
argument to further explain the failure of the OTD model.34 He contends
it was caused by social distance—a variance in the levels of trust and
reciprocity between, on one hand, borrowers of residential mortgage
loans and, on the other hand, investors in the securities backed by those
mortgage loans (the residential mortgage-backed securities, or RMBS)
and servicers of those loans.35 He also argues how to close this social
distance.36 We do not have sufficient empirical evidence, however, to
know the extent to which social distance explains the failure of the OTD
model. It appears likely, however, it could help to explain at least part of
that failure: inefficiencies and misunderstandings created by conflicting
interests of individual home mortgagors and institutional collection
agents hired to enforce defaulted and delinquent mortgage loans for the
benefit of large RMBS investors.37
31

Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 4–5.
Turk, supra note 18, at 882.
33
Schwarcz, supra note 27, at 6–8; cf. infra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
34
Jonathan C. Lipson, Securitization and Social Distance, 37 REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 827, 829 (2018).
35
Id. at 830–31 (defining the concept of social distance).
36
Id. at 855 (“Closing the social distance created by the legal distance of RMBS
securitization requires four things: (i) timely information exchange; (ii)
communication; (iii) authority to act; and (iv) a mechanism to formally recognize
the resolution.”).
37
See id. at 846–55 (arguing RMBS contract terms kept borrowers and loan
servicers apart at times when they could have resolved a default through
negotiations and avoided inefficient judicial foreclosures). But see Jeff Holt, A
Summary of the Primary Causes of the Housing Bubble and the Resulting Credit
Crisis: A Non-Technical Paper, 8 J. BUS. INQUIRY 120, 120–29 (2009) (finding
loose lending standards and poor underwriting practices before a social
relationship existed between the parties were a primary cause of the housing
32
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Finally, while Professor Turk concurs post-crisis regulation of
securitization has accomplished little, he argues administrative enforcement actions against securitization sponsors, which resulted in multibillion dollar settlements, have actually accomplished some real reform.38
He maintains that these settlements, considered as a whole, create a “de
facto legal prohibition against misconduct in securitization markets,
roughly equivalent to a negligence standard.”39 Although some scholars
see these settlements merely as the cost of doing business,40 the settlements no doubt have had some impact in making securitization sponsors
more careful.41 My concern with these enforcement actions and resulting
settlements, however, is two-fold. First, to the extent securitization
sponsors in fact acted illegally, “firms themselves are second-best targets
of deterrence. Targeting managers in their personal capacity is thus
widely viewed as a greater, if not also a more optimal, deterrent than
firm-level liability.”42 Second, as Turk himself acknowledges, many of
these settlements were compelled by reputational and politically induced
duress on securitization sponsors that in fact acted legally; they therefore
create more of a strict liability than a negligence standard.43 Imposing ex
post strict liability for legal actions is inconsistent with “the American
legal system’s commitment to ‘rule of law’ values.”44
IV.

Rebuilding Confidence

The revival of securitization will depend on rebuilding confidence.45 This, in turn, depends on developing a regulatory framework that
maximizes securitization’s benefits and minimizes potential for harm.46

bubble, thus suggesting social distance appears much less likely to explain
origination-related failures of the OTD model).
38
Turk, supra note 18, at 912–16 (referring to this administrative lawmaking as
“regulation by settlement”).
39
Id. at 925.
40
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Excessive Corporate Risk-Taking and the Decline of
Personal Blame, 65 EMORY L.J. 533, 537–38 (2015) (discussing these views of
Professors Anat Admati and John Coffee).
41
Id. at 537.
42
Id. at 536.
43
Turk, supra note 18, at 918–19 (discussing a strict liability standard).
44
Turk himself recognizes this conundrum. See id. at 912.
45
Cf. Miguel Segoviano et al., Reviving Securitization, in FINANCIAL STABILITY
REVIEW 51, 52 (Banque de Fr. ed., 19th ed. 2015).
46
Id. at 57.
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To achieve this, the United States could learn from the European Union.47
The EU is creating a regulatory framework favouring simple, transparent,
and standardized (STS) securitization.48 The STS framework is specifically designed to increase investor confidence in securitization.49
The STS framework addresses the issue of complexity, one of
the two fundamental causes of market failures (the other being change)
that apply distinctively to securitization.50 By simplifying securitization
structures, it should help to make disclosure more effective, in contrast to
disclosure’s occasional failure in much more highly complex securitization transactions.51
The STS framework also directly discourages complexity.52 Prior
to the financial crisis, securities issued in many securitization transactions
47

Christian Noyer, The Financing of the Economy in the Post-Crisis Period:
Challenges and Risks for Financial Stability, in FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW 7,
9 (Banque de Fr. ed., 19th ed. 2015) (explaining how the European Union is in
the process of implementing initiatives to revive the securitisation market).
48
Id.
49
See Commission First Status Report on Capital Markets Union, at 2–3, 21,
SWD (2016) 147 final (Apr. 25, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/
cmu-first-status-report_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MY8F-J84Z]. The STS framework includes requiring: (i) a true sale or similar transfer of the underlying
financial assets; (ii) those financial assets must meet simplicity requirements,
including homogeneity, creditworthiness (e.g., not in default, not from insolvent
obligors or obligors with adverse credit history), and not constituting already
securitized financial assets; (iii) interest-rate and exchange-rate risks must be
hedged; (iv) other than to effect such hedging, the financial assets cannot be
supported by derivatives, as would occur in a “synthetic” securitization; (v)
transaction documents must clearly specify obligations, duties, and responsibilities
of the servicer and back-up servicer to ensure efficient and continuing servicing of
the financial assets and must also include clear provisions facilitating the timely
resolution of conflicts among different classes of investors; (vi) and investors must
receive a cash-flow model of anticipated collections on the financial assets,
supported by information on historical default, delinquency, and loss performance
for substantially similar financial assets to those being securitized. Also, a sample
of the financial assets may be subject to external verification by an independent
party. See Schwarcz, supra note 20.
50
Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization and Post-Crisis Financial Regulation, 102
CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 115, 131–33 (2016).
51
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure’s Failure in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 3
UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1113 (2008) (“The complexity of the transactions, however,
caused the disclosures to be insufficient, cutting into the very heart of federal
securities regulation . . . .”).
52
Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 121.
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were “re-securitized” in complex and highly leveraged “ABS CDO”
transactions.53 Repayment of the re-securitized securities issued in these
transactions was so “extremely sensitive to cash-flow variations” that,
when “the cash-flow assumptions turned out to be wrong, many of these
[securities] defaulted or were downgraded.”54 That, in turn, sparked a loss
of confidence not only in securitization generally but also in the value of
credit ratings and of all highly rated debt securities.55 The STS framework
strongly disincentivizes these types of complex transactions.56
More may be needed, however, to address the second market
failure—change.57 Although the financial system is constantly changing,
financial regulation is normally tethered to the distinctive design and
structure of financial firms, markets, and products in existence when the
regulation is promulgated.58 Without continuous monitoring and
updating—which rarely occurs because it is costly and subject to political
interference—present-day regulation can quickly become outmoded.59
Prior to the financial crisis, for example, the entrenched legacy of bank
regulation obscured the fact that securitization had replaced a significant
portion of the need for bank financing.60 Kravitt, Burki, and Lee concur
“[o]nly continuous evaluation will allow all market participants to gain a
deeper understanding of the financial system . . . .”61
Securitization itself is particularly prone to change.62 Although
the Dodd-Frank Act focuses on regulating mortgage-loan securitization,63
53

The term ABS CDO refers to a securitization of collateralized debt obligations.
Schwarcz, supra note 7, at 1285.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 1285–86 (using Enron as an example).
56
See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 134–36.
57
Id. at 137 (arguing that regulators cannot predict the types of assets that will
securitized in the future).
58
See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Financial Change: A
Functional Approach, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1441, 1442 (2016) (discussing the
need to regulate financial change).
59
Id. at 1443.
60
Id. at 1443–44 (“[T]he pre-crisis financial regulatory framework . . . failed to
adequately address a collapsing financial system in which the majority of funding
had become non-bank intermediated.”); cf. Schwarcz, supra note 5, at 2.
61
Kravitt et al., supra note 17, at 784.
62
See also id. (explaining how regulation requires “constant reevaluation” due to
changes in securitization).
63
The Dodd-Frank Act focuses on a range of mortgage lending laws, including
ability-to-repay rules, high-cost mortgage and homeownership counselling,
modifications to mortgage servicing rules, modifications to the Equal Credit
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virtually any type of financial asset—of which mortgage loans are but
one example—can be securitized.64 Regulators simply cannot predict and
attempt to prevent all future financial problems.65 To illustrate this,
compare how two very different types of financial assets were at the core
of both the financial crisis and the Great Depression.
Prior to the Depression, many banks engaged in margin
lending to risky borrowers, securing the loans by shares
of stock that the borrowers purchased with the loan
proceeds. The value of the stock collateral started out
being at least equal to the amount of the loan, and banks
assumed that the stock market, which had been
continuously rising in value for some years, would
continue to rise, or at least not decline, in value. At the
time, that assumption was viewed as reasonable. In
August 1929, however, there was a (relatively) modest
decline in stock prices, causing some of these margin
loans to become under-collateralized. Some banks that
were heavily engaged in margin lending then lost so
much money on the loans that they themselves became
unable to pay their debts . . . . These debts consisted not
only of amounts due depositors but, more systemically
significant, debts due to other banks. As a result, defaults
by these margin-lending banks on their obligations to
other banks often adversely affected the other banks’
ability to meet their obligations to yet other banks, and
66
“so on down the chain of banks and beyond.”
This almost perfectly paralleled the problem with “subprime”
mortgage loans at the heart of the financial crisis. Banks and other lenders
Opportunity Act, appraisals under the Truth in Lending Act, and loan originator
compensation structures. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, THE CFPB DODDFRANK
MORTGAGE
RULES
READINESS
GUIDE
(2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_readiness-guide_mortgageimplementation.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6FT-DQX7]
64
Schwarcz, supra note 6, at 1295–98.
65
Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1442–45.
66
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an
Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1356–57 (2011)
(evaluating the types of financial assets at issue during the Great Depression and
2008 financial crisis).
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loaned money to risky borrowers to enable them to buy homes.67 The
borrowers secured the loans by mortgaging the homes they purchased
with the loan proceeds.68 The value of the homes started out being at least
equal to the amount of the loan, and lenders assumed home prices, which
had been continuously rising for some years, would continue to rise, or at
least not decline, in value—an assumption that, at the time, was viewed
as reasonable.69 In 2007, however, a decline in the housing market caused
some of these mortgage loans to become under-collateralized, triggering
the wave of defaults that started the financial crisis.70
Although one might argue that lenders should have seen that
possibility, two flaws obscured their sight: first, it is human nature for
people to assess the present by their experience of the recent past;71
second, political pressure by Congress on banks and mortgage lenders
induced them to make subprime mortgage loans to facilitate home
ownership.72 Another impediment is that financial change can evolve
incrementally, preventing recognition of increasing risk.73
V.

Lessons

Traditional ex ante regulation designed to prevent a financial
failure is necessary, but inherently insufficient.74 Complexity and change

67

Id.
Id.
69
Id. at 1359–60 (“These securities maintained their value so long as
home prices appreciated, as they had been doing for decades and as most market
observers assumed would continue.”).
70
Id. at 1360.
71
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complacency: Human Limitations
and Legal Efficacy, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2018) (explaining
availability bias).
72
See Peter J. Wallison, Dissenting Statement to FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 441, 452–53 (2011) (discussing how
political pressure led Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to lower mortgage
underwriting standards).
73
Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation,
Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 686–87 (2012) (claiming
the “incremental nature of the processes through which financial innovations
become highly complex is critical to understanding how that complexity
develops and why that complexity itself may not be subjected to close scrutiny”).
74
Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1448 (describing how ex ante regulation often
fails since it is difficult to predict the cause of the next financial crisis).
68
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make it difficult if not impossible to predict, and thus avert, failures.75 Ex
ante regulation of securitization thus should be supplemented by ex post
regulation to mitigate the consequences of inevitable financial failures.76
Symposium author Frankel suggests another lesson about
regulating securitization.77 In the past, she argued the law of cross-border
securitization “is developed and established by the lawyers who structure
these transactions,” referring to this as lex Juris.78 She has also discussed
how lex Juris helped standardize the laws regarding securitization, such
as laws regarding bankruptcy remoteness of asset transfers.79 In this
symposium edition, Professor Frankel provides a contrasting discussion
of the EU’s STS framework.80 Asking who should regulate, she argues
that the government should regulate “on a higher scale” and lawyers
should regulate on the lower scale of “individual cases.”81
I would answer the question of who should regulate slightly
differently. Lawyers, sometimes aided by their clients, normally make
transaction-specific rules, which govern how securitization and other
financial transactions operate.82 These rules are intended to maximize
transactional efficiency, thereby benefiting the parties to the transaction.83
Lawyers and their clients are not necessarily motivated, however, to
make rules that constrain externalities.84 Therefore, governments should
75

See Schwarcz, supra note 50, at 134–38.
See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can
Address the Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEX. L. REV. 75 (2013). In a
broader financial context, I have also analyzed how regulation could better
address change by regulating finance functions, which remain more constant
over time. See Schwarcz, supra note 58, at 1441.
77
Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: From Lex Juris to
Codes of Law, 37 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 771 (2018).
78
Tamar Frankel, The Law of Cross-Border Securitization: Lex Juris, 12 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 475, 480 (2002).
79
Id. at 479–80.
80
Frankel, supra note 77, at 777–78.
81
Id. at 778.
82
Frankel, supra note 78, at 480 (“Lawyers and other professionals, such as
investment bankers, create many innovative structures on which the success of
the transactions may depend.”).
83
Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500–02 (2007) (arguing lawyers create unique
transaction-specific rules to minimize regulatory costs, which improves overall
efficiency).
84
See Steven L. Schwarcz, Misalignment: Corporate Risk-Taking and Public
Duty, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 35–36 (2016) (distinguishing transactional
efficiency and societal efficiency); cf. Steven L. Schwarcz, Too Big to Fool:
76
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make those rules to protect society,85 such as the EU’s promulgation of
the STS framework.

Moral Hazard, Bailouts, and Corporate Responsibility, 102 MINN. L. REV. 761,
770–71 (2017) (showing systemic harm can be externalized onto market
participants, the government, and the public).
85
Schwarcz, supra note 84, at 5 (arguing “corporate governance law should, and
feasibly could, take into account risk-taking that causes systemic externalities”).

